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Abstract Although there is no in-principle impediment to
an EvoDevo of behavior, such an endeavor is not as
straightforward as one might think; many of the key terms
and concepts used in EvoDevo are tailored to suit its tra-
ditional focus on morphology, and are consequently diffi-
cult to apply to behavior. In this light, the application of the
EvoDevo conceptual toolkit to the behavioral domain
requires the establishment of a set of tractable concepts that
are readily applicable to behavioral characters. Here, I
begin the type of theoretical work that needs to be under-
taken in order to achieve this, focusing in particular on the
key concept of ‘‘novelty.’’ Building on existing criteria
used for the identification of behavioral homology from
behavioral ecology, I develop a set of operational criteria
for identifying novelty in the behavioral domain. These
criteria provide a conceptual foundation for the study of
novelty in behavioral traits.
Keywords Behavior  EvoDevo  Homology 
Non-homology  Novelty
Many of the standing definitions of ‘‘novelty’’ within
EvoDevo have their origins in Mu¨ller (1990, pp. 99–101),
who defines it as the appearance of a qualitatively new
structural feature. While Mu¨ller’s definition is not in
error—the vast majority of work in EvoDevo concerns
morphological evolution, and the definition has currency in
this domain—it is not immediately clear how a notion of
novelty that relies on structural similarities and differences
could be applied to behavioral characters. This presents a
challenge for those interested in understanding behavioral
novelty and innovation within the EvoDevo context (e.g.,
Bertossa 2011; Brown 2014).
That a novelty concept can be applied to behavior at all
is prima facie motivated by some classic studies in ethol-
ogy using variation in behavioral traits over time to build
phylogenies. Van Tets (1965), for example, used inter-
species variation in the display behaviors of the Pelicani-
form birds to build a phylogeny of these species that has
ultimately been largely vindicated by modern molecular
evidence (Kennedy et al. 1996). More recently, McLennan
et al. (1988) and Johnston and Page (1992) used fish nest-
associated behaviors and reproductive strategies respec-
tively to build phylogenies. In addition to this phylogenetic
work, attempts to operationalize the concept of ‘‘innova-
tion’’ in animal behavior (e.g., Reader and Laland 2003;
Ramsey et al. 2007) highlight the potential for successful
criteria for the identification of behavioral novelty; inno-
vation and novelty being closely related concepts.
In this article, I build on this existing work to offer a
clear account of what novelty amounts to in the behavioral
domain. I begin by highlighting the centrality of the project
of explaining novelty within the EvoDevo research pro-
gram and outlining the prevailing approaches to novelty
therein. Following this, I move on to the question of the
appropriate definition of novelty for the behavioral domain.
Some Background to Novelty in EvoDevo
The Origination Problem
A key motivation of EvoDevo as a research program arises
from the understanding that Darwin’s theory of evolution
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by natural selection, while capable of explaining adaptation
and diversity in the tree of life, cannot account for the
origination of traits. More specifically, the theory of evo-
lution by natural selection does not tell us how the supply
of phenotypic variation within populations arises (i.e., how
traits originate), and consequently cannot explain (a) why
selection is able to occur, and (b) why certain traits exist in
populations and others do not (Sterelny and Griffiths 1999,
p. 384). According to proponents of EvoDevo, the received
view of evolution—the Modern Synthesis (MS hence-
forth)—also fails to adequately respond to the question of
origination, because it includes untenable empirical
assumptions about the source of phenotypic variation to
natural selection and the nature of the variation itself
(Mu¨ller and Newman 2005; Mu¨ller 2007).1
First, it is assumed in the MS that the supply of phe-
notypic variation to natural selection is solely a product of
unbiased genetic mutation and recombination (Dobzhansky
1957, 1971; Mayr and Provine 1981).2 The assumption of
isotropism is important. With this, the phenotypic variation
to selection becomes explanatorily impotent with respect to
the particular outcomes of the evolutionary process over
long timescales (over and above its role in providing the
raw material on which selection acts). It is natural selection
(rather than the nature of the supply of phenotypic variation
to selection) that explains why we have the traits we have
in populations.
A second related empirical assumption in the MS is that
all evolutionary change is gradual. Harking back to Dar-
win’s own work (1958), it is assumed that evolutionary
change occurs in incremental steps, and that the size of
those steps is small (Mayr and Provine 1998; Huxley
2010).3 This assumption responds to the second part of the
origination problem—explaining how evolution can come
about; it explains how complex adaptation can arise (via
the accumulation of small adaptive steps).
Advocates of the EvoDevo alternative question the
empirical justification for these assumptions of the MS, and
thus whether the MS presents an adequate response to the
origination problem (Mu¨ller and Newman 2005). They
offer two sources of evidence motivating their skepticism.
First, advocates of EvoDevo offer evidence that the
supply of phenotypic variation to natural selection is fre-
quently biased and constrained, particularly by develop-
ment. This evidence suggests that architects of the MS
underestimated the depth of the origination problem; rather
than being explanatorily impotent with respect to the out-
comes of evolution, genetic recombination and mutation
(and other processes, such as development) may be very
important to accounting for the tree of life (Alberch 1982;
Maynard Smith et al. 1985; Hall 1999; Jablonka and Lamb
2006; Mu¨ller 2008).
Second, proponents of EvoDevo offer evidence of traits
that do not fit the gradualist picture presented in the MS.
Features such as the tetrapod limb (Capdevila and Izpisu´a
2000), the neural crest (Hall 2005), the shell of turtles
(Gilbert et al. 2001; Rieppel 2001), and feathers (Brush
1996; Prum 1999; Prum and Brush 2002) are all examples
of characters that appear discontinuous with the characters
that evolved before them. They are apparent counterex-
amples to the idea that all evolutionary change is gradual,
and thus purely the product of genetic variation as it is
traditionally construed.
Such jumps in phenotypic space are difficult for the MS
to account for mechanistically, further undermining the
simplistic picture of origination it presents (i.e., it is diffi-
cult to explain these phenomena solely using selection
coupled with random mutation and recombination).4 Ran-
dom mutations of large phenotypic effect are unlikely to be
fitness enhancing or neutral; they are much more likely to
be deleterious, and thus unlikely to be maintained in pop-
ulations under selection. Furthermore, even if by luck a
trait generated by a mutation of large phenotypic effect
were to turn out to be adaptive, it is unlikely that it would
become fixed in the population where it arose, because
fixation relies on inheritance and amplification. Both
require persistence and reproduction but the persistence of
‘‘one-off’’ characters of any type in a population is highly
vulnerable to chance events. Individuals that have a strong
propensity to survive and reproduce do not always do so,
making the fixation of adaptive mutations of large
1 While the origination problem was identified and discussed both by
Darwin and the architects of the MS, it was not considered a major
challenge, and, by some, even considered to be resolved (Burian
1988). The structural alternative, while always present, has only
recently gained prominence through EvoDevo (Amundson 2005).
2 It is important to keep in mind that both the assumptions discussed
here are simplifying assumptions (idealizations) rather than empirical
claims. While advocates of the MS defend a gene-centric picture of
evolution, they do not deny that the supply of variation to natural
selection is biased in some situations; rather they claim that such
situations are the exception to the vast majority of circumstances.
3 Note, this is not an assumption about the rate of evolutionary
change; it rather is an assumption about the nature of that change.
4 Not everyone agrees with this assessment of the explanatory power
of the MS (e.g., Hoekstra and Coyne 2007; Lynch 2007a, b). They
argue that the MS, and population genetics in particular, has the
means to account for the origination of form via the basic mechanisms
of genetic recombination and mutation, and that those who deny this
are only able to do so because they assume an impoverished picture of
the causal power of genetic drift and recombination. Rather than
offering an unlikely explanation for ‘‘jumps in phenotype,’’ small
changes in the genotype, they claim, are capable of generating
significant phenotypic shifts via their action in broader gene networks
and on accumulated neutral mutations. While interesting, I set aside
this challenge to the EvoDevo picture here. This issue will only be
resolved by further research into novelties and innovation. Such
research requires a clear notion of what is to be explained and thus, if
anything, provides motivation for the work herein.
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phenotypic effect unlikely. Ultimately, while genetic
mutation and recombination alone offer a potential expla-
nation for ‘‘jumps’’ in phenotypic space, they offer a highly
improbable one (Goldschmidt 1940).
The EvoDevo research program, in exploring the role
that development plays in evolution, offers an alternative
means of explaining the origination of traits and ‘‘gaps’’ in
the tree of life to that offered in the MS. Advocates of
EvoDevo take seriously the role that development can play
in structuring the supply of phenotypic variation and
facilitating the generation of stable phenotypes in the face
of genetic change, thereby enabling evolutionary ‘‘jumps’’
in phenotypic space to take place (Wagner 2005, 2012).
For example, they point to the role that plasticity in the
development of the nerves within the limbs of mammals
plays in the generation of a viable phenotype even when
mutations that have significant effects on limb morphology
occur (Kirschner and Gerhart 2006). Many in EvoDevo
believe that discontinuities in the tree of life cannot arise
without the action of special innovative mechanisms at the
developmental level (e.g., Mu¨ller 2010). Although others
are less strident in their a priori assumptions,5 a central
focus in EvoDevo is upon gaining an understanding of how
novelties or discontinuities in the tree of life arise, and the
role development plays in this.
Despite agreement regarding the centrality of the prob-
lem of origination to the EvoDevo research agenda, there
has remained long-standing disagreement about the
appropriate terminology to use within this domain. One
source of such disagreement has been the commonly used
term ‘‘novelty’’ (and the associated term ‘‘innovation’’).
Defining Novelty: The Problem
The term ‘‘novelty’’ features heavily within discussions of
origination in EvoDevo. Unfortunately, there is no clear
agreement on what the term means. Table 1 is a summary
of the key definitions of the term in the literature.
As shown in Table 1, there are multiple definitions of
novelty in use within EvoDevo. Furthermore, these defi-
nitions differ enough to give conflicting assessments of
novelty. For example, according to definitions (1), (2), and
(5), whether or not a trait is a novelty depends on how it
evolved. In contrast, definitions (3) and (4) are ‘‘forward-
looking’’—whether or not a trait is a novelty depends on
the ways it can change, or changes it can facilitate, in the
future (Brigandt and Love 2012). As a result, a trait could
feasibly count as a novelty according to (1) but not
according to (3). To illustrate, although the appearance of a
non-homologous trait, such as a new digit (a novelty on
definition (1)), within a population will open up some parts
of phenotypic possibility space to a population for future
evolution, it is likely to restrict others (and thus, will not
necessarily be a novelty on definition (3)). This is not the
only conflict between the definitions. For example,
Arthur’s (2000) definition (5) is extremely permissive—
any new variation that arises in a population counts as a
novelty (no matter how discontinuous it is with the previ-
ous variation)—while definition (1) is quite restrictive—
novelty only refers to traits that are clearly discontinuous
with earlier variation. Hence, traits that are novelties
according to (1) will represent only a subset of those that
are novelties according to (5) (Pigliucci 2008).
In part, these conflicts arise because there are three broad
types of novelty definition in play: process-based definitions,
character-based definitions, and prospective-product defi-
nitions. According to process-based definitions, novelties are
those traits generated by a particular process. Definition (2),
for example, is a process-based definition. Critics of these
types of definition argue that they fail to reliably pick out
discontinuities in the tree of life of the type that cannot be
explained by the MS; i.e., they fail to pick out the explan-
andum of interest to EvoDevo (Peterson and Mu¨ller 2012). In
contrast, character-based definitions focus on character
homologies (i.e., discontinuity in characters). Definitions
(1), (5), and (6) are broadly character-based. Such definitions
are criticized for being too restrictive (Moczek 2008; Pig-
liucci 2008), and too reliant on the already problematic
concept of homology (Moczek 2008; Brigandt and Love
2010; Hallgrı´msson et al. 2012; Peterson and Mu¨ller 2012).6
The third type of definition, prospective-product definitions,
relates to the potential for the origination of a trait to allow
future evolution. For example, definitions (3) and (4) focus
on the impact that a trait has on the adaptive potential of a
lineage. Such definitions are difficult to use as they rely on
information about counterfactual possibilities. They also do
not adequately distinguish between standard genetic varia-
tion and the type of phenotypic change of interest to Evo-
Devo, i.e., discontinuous change.
It should be unsurprising that there are many definitions
of a key term such as novelty in a science as young as
EvoDevo. Unfortunately, for my purpose here the many
definitions have the potential to hinder any attempt to apply
5 Hall (2005), for example, does not rule out the possibility that the
type of changes that underpin standard phenotypic variation also
underpin large phenotypic changes in at least some cases.
6 Mu¨ller (2010) offers a more nuanced account of novelty which
responds to criticisms of Mu¨ller and Wagner’s (1991) definition (also
see discussion in Peterson and Mu¨ller 2012). While I am in favor of
this more nuanced approach, it still relies on attribution of homology
and the use of concepts such as ‘‘body plan’’ which are hard to
conceive of in the behavioral domain. Thus, in this article I focus on
the more rudimentary definition as a way to gain some traction on the
issue (more nuanced definitions of behavioral novelty will inevitably
follow).
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the EvoDevo conceptual framework to behavior. When
applying a conceptual framework in a new domain it helps
to have clear, agreed-upon concepts in the first place.
Although the definitions in Table 1 are reasonably succinct
(so confusion could be avoided by stipulation), conceptual
disagreement is often a symptom of deeper theoretical
divisions within a science. This makes deciding which
definition of novelty to use in an EvoDevo of behavior less
straightforward than if there were one clear and agreed-
upon approach. Brigandt and Love (2012) offer a way
forward.
Defining Novelty: A Solution
Brigandt and Love (2012) use the persistence and utility of
the many existing usages of the term novelty in EvoDevo
to argue that the role of the concept in the field is epistemic
rather than definitional. Novelty, they say, is an organizing
concept for EvoDevo. The various novelty definitions in
Table 1 structure the problem space in the field, clarifying
various aspects of its explanatory agenda in different, but
still useful, ways. In this light, the utility of each definition
varies depending on the research question being enter-
tained. For some questions, definition (1) will be best; for
other questions, the other definitions might be more useful.
Hence, according to Brigandt and Love (2012), those dis-
agreeing about the ‘‘right’’ concept or definition of novelty
are misguided, at least insofar as they are motivated by a
desire for a single unified approach. No single unified
concept can appropriately capture all the roles played by
the term in EvoDevo; rather, ‘‘novelty’’ is best understood
as referring to a cluster of related concepts and phenomena.
This approach to novelty captures well the role the
various existing novelty definitions play in science. Traits
that satisfy definition (3), for example, are a useful guide to
the ‘‘special mechanisms’’ underpinning evolvability.
Similarly, non-homology (definition (1)) serves as a useful
guide to researchers interested in ‘‘special’’ developmental
mechanisms of ‘‘innovation.’’ As discussed in the intro-
duction, many in EvoDevo believe that these ‘‘special’’
mechanisms will be developmental, and thus novelty,
whether defined as (1) or (3), offers a promising area of
research for those seeking to establish the importance of
development in evolutionary biology.
Focusing on Novelty as Non-Homology
Here, I will assume Brigandt and Love’s (2012) cluster
concept account, thereby justifying focusing on one par-
ticular definition of novelty—novelty as non-homology.7 I
have chosen to focus specifically on novelty qua non-
homology for three reasons.
First, identifying novelty with non-homology is one of
the oldest, and by far the most common, approaches within
EvoDevo. Hence, it is likely to offer a useful theoretical
kind—concepts that are not useful tend not to persist—and
an uncontroversial starting point for work on novelty in
behavior.
Second, there is an (albeit, small) empirical literature on
homology in behavior that I can draw on in modifying this
approach for my purposes here. For other existing defini-
tions of novelty, the conceptual groundwork is not nearly
so clear. For example, adopting definition (2) of novelty for
an EvoDevo of behavior would be highly challenging in
practice, as it relies heavily on empirical information about
Table 1 Usages of the term ‘‘novelty’’ in evolutionary biology
The term ‘‘novelty’’ is used to refer to Reference(s)
A new feature in a group of organisms that is not homologous to a feature in an
ancestral taxon
Mu¨ller and Wagner (1991, p. 243), West-Eberhard (2003,
p. 98), Hall (2005, p. 549)
Traits that ‘‘have evolved both by a transition between adaptive peaks on the
fitness landscape and … overcome previous developmental constraint’’
Hallgrı´msson et al. (2012)
A trait which allows for future morphological variation and diversification that did
not previously exist (i.e., increases evolvability)
Mu¨ller and Wagner (2003), Wagner and Stradler (2003),
Wagner and Larsson (2006), Brigandt (2007)
‘‘…any newly acquired structure or property that permits the performance of a
new function, which, in turn, will open a new adaptive zone’’
Mayr (1963, p. 602)
Apomorphies: unique derived features of taxa that carry no phylogenetic
information
Arthur (2000, p. 811)
‘‘New traits or behaviors, or novel combinations of previously existing traits or
behaviors, arising during the evolution of a lineage, and that perform a new
function within the ecology of that lineage’’
Pigliucci (2008)
7 Broadly speaking, two traits are non-homologous if they are not
derived from the same ancestral structure. Note that non-homology is
not the same thing as homoplasy (resemblance due to common
selective history) despite this also often being contrasted with
homology.
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behavioral adaptation and development that is not yet
readily available.8
Third, the non-homology approach to novelty allows us
to target research in EvoDevo to traits whose evolution is
likely to be significantly influenced by development (i.e.,
evolutionary events where we might expect mechanisms
other than genetic mutation and recombination to be in
play). For the reasons discussed earlier, non-homologies, as
discontinuities in the tree of life, are traits that are most
likely to originate through special mechanisms of ‘‘inno-
vation.’’ Hence, non-homology serves as a good heuristic
for limiting the scope of enquiry in EvoDevo, and making
tractable the challenge of explaining the origination of
traits (Brigandt and Love 2012).
In accordance with Brigandt and Love (2012), a good
definition of novelty is one that focuses attention on some
important question within the purview of the origination
problem. Attempts to arbitrate between the different can-
didate definitions of the term in EvoDevo on the grounds
that some pick out ‘‘true’’ novelty and others do not are
mistaken. Rather, we should ask ourselves for each can-
didate definition: ‘‘Does this definition of novelty pick out
a class of entities that can play a useful role in the science
of origination?’’
Importantly, novelty as non-homology plays such a role
even if it turns out that many apparent ‘‘novelties’’ or non-
homologies are actually homologous to earlier characters
when explored further. The turtle shell offers an illustrative
case in point here. Not long ago, the turtle shell was con-
sidered a paradigmatic example of a non-homologous trait
(i.e., a novelty) (Rieppel 2001). Recently, however, fossils
of species ancestral to turtles have been found that have
bony structures related to the ribs located in the appropriate
parts of the body plan for them to be the morphological
precursors to the turtle shell. The turtle shell is derived
from these existing morphological structures rather than a
de novo structure in its own right, and thus is no longer
considered a novelty (Hall and Kerney 2012). Novelty as
non-homology has not failed here, however, looking for
non-homologies has allowed researchers to focus their
efforts upon a case that tests some of the key premises of
EvoDevo relating to origination. Finding precursors to the
turtle shell challenges the idea that there are discontinuities
in the tree of life, and that developmental mechanisms are
central to explaining them. If it turns out that all cases of
apparent non-homology are explicable by the traditional
mechanisms of variation and gradual change (as may be the
case for turtles),9 the EvoDevo challenge to the MS will
likely fail.10 If, on the other hand, some cases of non-
homology hold up to scrutiny, they offer a good starting
point for those looking for special developmental mecha-
nisms of innovation and origination. Either way, novelty as
non-homology will have served a useful purpose in orga-
nizing and structuring the research agenda of EvoDevo. It
is in this light that the remainder of the article focuses on
novelty as non-homology. In particular, I focus on whether
the concept can be fruitfully applied to behavioral traits. As
we shall see, the second conceptual challenge to an Evo-
Devo of behavior that I introduced at the start of this
article—the focus on morphological features in our con-
cepts—presents a barrier to this project (though not an
insurmountable one). I begin by looking at the application
of the non-homology concept to morphological traits in a
little more detail.
Identifying Non-Homology: The Morphological
Tradition
Non-homology is a relationship that holds between traits in
related species which are not derived from the same ancestral
structure. It is best understood when contrasted with
homology (traits that share a common ancestral origin as a
consequence of descent from a common ancestor). Deter-
mining whether traits are non-homologous (i.e., novelties)
requires us to test perceived discontinuities in the tree of life,
and establish whether they are real or merely illusory. Within
EvoDevo the classification of traits as novelties qua non-
homologies thus involves ruling out the possibility that they
are homologies. In effect, if a trait cannot be shown to be
homologous to any other then it is considered to be a novelty
(Mu¨ller and Wagner 1991; Mu¨ller and Newman 2005;
Mu¨ller 2010). Unfortunately for our purposes here, homol-
ogy is traditionally a strongly morphological notion that
remains difficult to apply to behavior.
Defining Homology
The concept of homology originated with the famous
Victorian naturalist Richard Owen (1843, p. 379), who
8 It is also dependent on the use of the ‘‘adaptive landscape’’ model.
Applications of this model within evolutionary biology have been
both controversial and methodologically challenging (Gavrilets 2004;
Pigliucci and Kaplan 2006; Kaplan 2008.
9 Although the evidence of ancestral shell precursors in the turtle
shell case undermines its status as a novelty qua non-homology, the
intermediaries are still not sufficient to show that evolution in this
case has been gradual. It may be the case that there have still been
‘‘jumps’’ (albeit smaller ones) in phenotypic space here.
10 Many would still argue that there was a role for EvoDevo even
were gradualism to be vindicated; the EvoDevo research program
offers a particular type of explanation not offered by the MS, i.e.,
lineage explanations (Calcott 2009). This type of mechanistic
explanation is importantly different from the type of explanation that
is offered by traditional evolutionary biology and population genetics.
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defined it as ‘‘the same organ in different animals under
every variety of form and function.’’ He contrasted it with
analogy or homoplasy, which he described as ‘‘a part or
organ in one animal which has the same function as another
part or organ in a different animal’’ (p. 374). Owen’s
approach to homology, motivated by the desire to identify
the phylogenetic relationships between organisms, is fun-
damentally a morphological notion. He was concerned
about comparing the presence and absence of ‘‘organs’’ and
the functional role they play across species. Modern
approaches to homology have remained relatively true to
Owen’s approach in practice (despite all agreeing that there
are behavioral homologies). Three operational criteria,
originating with Adolf Remane (1952),11 are each consid-
ered sufficient for homology today (Brigandt 2003; Grif-
fiths 2007).
The first of these criteria concerns the relative position
of the characters in the overall body plan of the organisms
they are found in. It says that two bones are homologous if
they share the same position in the body plan. For example,
as illustrated in Fig. 1, when we compare the forelimbs of
the whale and human, we see similar arrangements of
bones, although the bones vary in size and shape. This
similarity in the internal structure of the forelimb between
whales and humans is the product of shared ancestry (both
species descended from a common ancestor that had the
basic bone arrangement), and hence they are homologous.
Remane’s second criterion concerns the shared posses-
sion of ‘‘special qualities’’—non-adaptive and distinctive
features of the characters being considered for homology.
As these features serve no function (and hence, are not the
product of convergent evolution), when two organisms
share special qualities they are more likely to share a
common ancestor. The more complex and more distinctive
these special qualities are, the greater the likelihood that
their presence in two different species is due to common
ancestry, rather than being independently derived. The
most famous example of a special character is the posi-
tioning of the blood supply to the retina between the retina
and the source of light in vertebrates. This positioning of
the blood supply is common to all vertebrates and is not
seen in invertebrate ‘‘eyes’’ such as those in cephalopods
and arthropods. Furthermore, it is also not a functionally
important feature of the vertebrate eye. For these reasons,
the positioning of the blood supply in the vertebrate eye is
considered to be a ‘‘special quality’’ for the purposes of
identifying homologous relationships, and has been used as
evidence of the common origin of all vertebrate eyes
(Griffiths 1997, 2007).
Remane’s third criterion concerns continuity between
characters. Two characters, according to this criterion, can
still be homologized (even if they fail the first two criteria)
if they can be connected by a series of intermediary traits in
other species. For example, there is a pair of bony struc-
tures at the rear end of the whale skeleton. If we trace the
evolution of these bony structures using fossils and the
comparison of whale anatomy with extant relatives such as
the hippopotamus, we can see that they are actually ves-
tigial hind limbs. Although they lack some elements of the
typical tetrapod limb, the bone structures are actually
homologous to the hind limb of mammal tetrapods.
Using Remane’s Criteria to Identify Non-Homology
Remane’s (1952) operational criteria were originally
intended for use in discerning homologies from homopla-
sies—something required when establishing the phyloge-
netic proximity of species. Those in EvoDevo concerned
with novelty and innovation, however, have also made use
of these criteria in the reverse when identifying non-
homologies; in effect, novelty begins where homology
ends (Moczek 2008). Mu¨ller and Wagner’s (1991) defini-
tion of novelty makes this explicit. According to them, ‘‘a
morphological novelty is a structure that is neither
homologous to any structure in the ancestral species nor
homonymous to any other structure in the same organism.’’
In practice, this means that if a character found within a
given lineage satisfies any of the above criteria for being
Fig. 1 An example of homology defined using relative position. The
forelimbs of the whale and human have the same structure, reflecting
their shared ancestry. Homologous relationships between some of the
bones are marked
11 The original 1952 text by Remane is in German. I relied on a
summary from Griffiths (2007) in composing this work.
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homologous to some other trait in the lineage, they cannot
also be non-homologous, and thus fail to be novelties.
Hence, when a potential novelty is being considered,
researchers look to the traits of close relatives for precur-
sors or related characters.
If there is no ancestral character in the location of the
potential novelty, there are no apparent intermediaries, and
no shared special qualities between the focal trait and other
traits in the lineage, then this is evidence for its non-
homology. For example, the appearance of a distinctly new
articulated joint in the presence of all the other ancestral
joints, and in the absence of any special characters would
be a novelty. The recent research into the turtle shell dis-
cussed earlier offers a good example of how these criteria
are used; current evidence being used to challenge the
previously well-accepted view that the shell is a novelty
(Hall and Kerney 2012).
Identifying Non-Homology: The Behavioral Domain
Can We Use Remane’s Criteria in an EvoDevo
of Behavior?
No one would deny that related species can share behav-
ioral traits due to common ancestry. Indeed, Konrad Lor-
enz (1974) saw the identification of homologies and
analogies as an essential source of knowledge in evolu-
tionary biology, including the evolutionary biology of
behavior. Unfortunately, however, it has historically been
the view that the plasticity of behavioral traits undermines
any attempts to identify behavioral homology at the general
functional level (Schneirla 1957; Atz 1970; Hodos 1976;
Beer 1984). In particular, the identification of homology
and analogy in morphology has tended to rely on
assumptions about phylogenetic proximity and resem-
blance to determine the identity of apparently homologous
traits, but the employment of these methods in behavioral
biology would rely on assumptions about the transform-
ability of behavioral traits that are unjustified (Beer 1984).
The plasticity of behavior has thus seen that attempts to
homologize behavior thus far have largely been reduc-
tionistic in nature. These attempts have used the morpho-
logical structures that are involved in behaviors, rather than
the behaviors themselves, as ‘‘tie breakers’’ in decisions
about whether traits are homologues or not (Hall 2013).
Although there have been attempts in the past 20 years to
offer operational criteria for homology in behavior that are
analogous to those offered by Remane (1952)—most
notably by ethologist John Wenzel (1992)—these criteria
have not been terribly successful. Behavioral biologists
have tended to rely on morphological data rather than
behavioral information when considering claims about the
evolutionary relationships between organisms. To some
extent such skepticism about homologizing behavior is
warranted.
In the past, the main motivation for the identification of
homologies was to establish common ancestry when
building phylogenetic trees. For such ends, traits that are
less variable are more reliable sources of evidence than
those that are very plastic (and thus may offer misleading
evidence). In modern phylogenetics, for example, genetic
similarities are now widely agreed to ‘‘trump’’ morpho-
logical data in the building of phylogenetic trees. There are
numerous accounts in the scientific literature of newly
uncovered molecular data causing the reconsideration of
phylogenetic relationships established using traditional
morphological techniques. This focus upon genetic simi-
larities is due to the fact that morphological similarities
between traits are possible despite lack of common
ancestry. Genetic similarity without common ancestry is
much less likely to occur. Thus, genetic similarity offers a
better source of evidence of the phylogenetic relationships
between species than similarity at the phenotypic level. In
EvoDevo however, homology plays a different role.
As discussed earlier, researchers in EvoDevo are inter-
ested in whether an apparently new trait within a species is
derived from some trait in an ancestor (i.e., is a homo-
logue) or is novel (i.e., is not a homologue), rather than
whether two species are related. It is also the case that, as
non-homology is a heuristic for guiding research in Evo-
Devo, it need not always be accurate (i.e., false positives
are acceptable). The narrow and reductionist approach to
homology in phylogenetics is thus not appropriate for
EvoDevo, and many in EvoDevo have advocated a plu-
ralistic alternative.
In what follows, I outline in a little more detail this
pluralistic approach to homology, highlighting its advan-
tages for EvoDevo. Given the fresh light shed on the issue
of homology in EvoDevo by the pluralistic picture, I then
take Wenzel’s (1992) operational criteria for behavioral
homology and consider their utility for the study of novelty
in an EvoDevo of behavior.
Pluralism and Homology
Patterns of continuity and discontinuity in phenotypes are
not always accompanied by discontinuities in the associ-
ated developmental or genetic architectures (Moczek
2008). To illustrate, the eyes of vertebrates, cephalopods,
and arthropods are remarkably similar morphological fea-
tures in many ways. If we look at the tree of life in terms of
morphology, however, we see big gaps between the
cephalopod, arthropod, and vertebrate eyes—each type of
eye arose as a novelty in its own lineage relatively inde-
pendently. Interestingly, this discontinuity in morphology
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is not completely reflected in the relevant genetic struc-
tures. Key aspects of the development of the eye in all three
taxa (in fact the entire Bilateria) are actually governed by
the action of a common master gene, Pax6 (Bolker and
Raff 1996; Rutishauser and Moline 2005). This gene rep-
resents an example of a deep homology in the genotype
despite the presence of morphological discontinuity.
Similarly, genetic and developmental discontinuities
have been identified that do not correspond to phenotypic
discontinuities. For example, the segmentation of insect
bodies is considered a homologous morphological feature
despite the fact that the developmental mechanisms and
genes governing segmentation vary significantly between
species. This disjoint between the phenotype and genotype
in insects exists because of the action of a number of
developmental mechanisms that ensure the stable expres-
sion of the insect body plan despite underlying change in
genetics and development (Abouheif 1997).
Variation in the patterns of discontinuity and continuity
in characters across development, genotype, and phenotype
are also seen in the behavioral domain (Lauder 1986, 1994;
Wenzel 1992; Rendall and Di Fiore 2007; Hall 2013). For
example, human language, sonar navigation in ocean
mammals, and birdsong lack the type of phenotypic simi-
larity usually associated with homology. They are gener-
ally considered to be independent phenotypic novelties in
each lineage. They do share a genetic homology, however,
all being underwritten by the function of the FoxP2 gene,
which is a deeply conserved vertebrate novelty (Scharff
and Petri 2011; Hall 2013).
Evidence of this type has led to a more pluralistic
understanding of homology in EvoDevo which underscores
the fact that novelties at the gross phenotypic level are not
always accompanied by discontinuities in genetics or
developmental program, and vice versa.12 Discontinuities
exist in the genetic, developmental, morphological, func-
tional, cognitive, and behavioral domains, but they do not
necessarily neatly line up together. For this reason, none of
these domains should have priority over any of the others
in terms of the assessment of homology in EvoDevo;
whether two traits are homologous depends on the domain
of assessment, though it may often be informative to
compare what is going on at different levels (Striedter and
Northcutt 1991; Hall 1994). For the purposes of those in
EvoDevo concerned with novelty qua non-homology, this
pluralistic approach to homology not only fits better with
the way that the world is organized, but also better serves
the explanatory role of novelty in appropriately targeting
research in this domain.
Pluralism and Novelty
A pluralistic approach to homology, and thus novelty qua
non-homology, better reflects our explanatory interest. For
example, discussions of evolvability are frequently con-
cerned with the features of developmental systems that
either limit or open up the possible phenotypic variation to
populations. Traits that are novelties qua non-homologies
are a good starting point from which to identify such fea-
tures. In this sense, novelty qua non-homology is a guide to
research in EvoDevo rather than a definitive indicator of
something ‘‘deeper.’’ Identifying novelties at either the
developmental, genetic, or phenotypic level is a starting
point for study rather than the ultimate goal of research.
Once a discontinuity of interest has been identified, com-
paring what is happening in different aspects of the
organism can help us to understand how the discontinuity
comes about. For example, new accounts of the evolu-
tionary process incorporating mechanisms such as genetic
accommodation (West-Eberhard 2003) emphasize the role
of plasticity in driving evolution.13 If such ‘‘plasticity-first’’
accounts of evolution are right, we should expect novel
traits to originate in plasticity within the phenotype that is
ultimately maintained and stabilized in populations via
novel genes or developmental mechanisms. A pluralistic
approach to non-homology captures the important role of
plasticity, while a purely morphological or developmental
approach would fail.
Another benefit of the pluralistic approach to novelty is
that it allows us to be agnostic toward the underlying
mechanisms of innovation. This is helpful when trying to
uncover the nature of innovation. For example, if we were
to focus only on novelties in morphology we could quite
easily miss the important role played by the accumulation
of neutral mutations in the generation of many phenotypic
novelties. An important insight of EvoDevo has been that
two traits that are homologous morphologically may
nonetheless be non-homologous genetically because of
neutral genetic change in one species but not another
(Wagner 2005). Hence, explaining a novel morphological
feature very often requires reference to changes in genetics,
development, and the environment that have occurred over
12 It is worth noting that the literature in this area of EvoDevo has
tended to talk about this as the ‘‘hierarchical’’ approach. I have tried
to avoid this label because the use of compositional language here is
misguided and misleading—genes are not ‘‘lower-level’’ components
of traits, they are rather precursors of traits. The reductionism in
question here is explanatory rather than ontological in nature.
13 There are a variety of related ‘‘plasticity-first’’ accounts of
evolution in the literature including genetic accommodation, genetic
assimilation, and the Baldwin effect. They originate early in the 20th
century with Spalding (1873) and Baldwin (1896), amongst others
(Lloyd Morgan 1896; Osborn 1896) but have reappeared many times
(e.g., Simpson 1953, Waddington 1953a, b) before their current
modern incarnation, which is best represented by the work of West-
Eberhard (2003).
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a period of time, rather than right when the new morpho-
logical feature is apparent. A pluralistic approach to nov-
elty does not miss this important phenomenon. Having
made clear novelty as it is understood with respect to
morphological traits, let us now turn to behavioral traits.
Wenzel: Remane Reconsidered
While it is accepted within EvoDevo that novelty exists in
behavior, little work has thus far been undertaken con-
cerning behavioral novelty. It is unsurprising therefore that
I have been unable to find clear operational criteria for
establishing novelty qua non-homology. It is in this light
that I here focus on an existing criteria for behavioral
homology and co-opt them for use in an EvoDevo of
behavior.
As already discussed, Remane (1952) proposed three
operational criteria for identifying homologies (physical
position, special qualities, and connection to intermediar-
ies) and Wenzel (1992) offers behavioral equivalents for
these along with examples from the literature. As with
Remane’s (1952) original criteria, a pair of traits need only
satisfy one of the criteria to count as homologues. The
criteria are as follows:
(1) Topology and positioning. A behavioral trait is
homologous to some other behavioral trait if it
occurs in the same position in a general pattern of
behavior. Examples offered include the tail wagging
movements of two species of cichlid fish that occur in
the same place in courtship ceremonies (Baerends
1958), and the various phases of behavior in the
greeting ceremonies of gulls and kittiwakes
(Tinbergen 1959).
(2) Special qualities. Two behavioral traits are more likely
to be homologous if they are complex and distinctive,
and also if there are arbitrary (i.e., non-adaptive)
similarities between the behaviors. Thus, behavioral
traits that are complex, distinctive, arbitrary, and
shared between two species are often classed as
homologies. The examples offered include elements
of bird displays and aspects of the webs of spiders.
(3) Continuity of intermediates. Two behavioral traits are
homologous if we can trace a series of evolutionary
steps between them on a continuum. Wenzel notes
that this criterion is often hard to accurately assess
because we do not have a clear notion of what the
intermediaries in behavior would be (e.g., what
would an intermediate function look like?).
Sometimes living relatives will offer this
information, but not always. As will be apparent,
this problem recurs for non-homology.
Having laid out Wenzel’s (1992) criterion, I now con-
sider whether they can be used to identify behavioural
novelty qua non homology in a manner similar to the way
Remane’s (1952) original criteria have been used to iden-
tify morphological novelties.
Applicability of the Criteria for Identifying Non-
Homologies in Behavior
Using the Criteria
Using Wenzel’s (1992) criteria we can compare behavioral
traits within lineages, and establish whether they are
homologous or not. If a behavioral trait in a given species
fails to be homologous with any behaviors observed in
ancestral or closely related species, then we can say that it
is non-homologous or novel. In the case of topology and
positioning, if we cannot find a behavioral element that
occupies the same position or topology as the focal
behavior in any closely related or ancestral species, then it
is a non-homology or novelty. For special characters, we
are looking for distinctive, non-adaptive elements that can
help to identify earlier iterations of the focal character. If a
special character is shared between a potential novelty and
some ancestral behavior then it is a homology, not a nov-
elty. Continuity can be used similarly to identify if a sup-
posed novelty is derived from ancestral traits. If none of the
criteria for homology are satisfied, we can assume the
behavior is non-homologous (and, hence, a novelty). In the
following, I offer two examples of how the criteria could
be used in courtship displays and birdsong.
Courtship displays are highly ritualized sequenced dis-
play behaviors used to attract and impress potential mates.
They are very common in birds, but are seen right across
the animal kingdom. Importantly, these displays very often
involve a series of highly stylized movements that are
largely innate; this makes for a more straightforward ana-
lysis than in cases where behavior is highly flexible. The
literature offers a clear example of Wenzel’s (1992) criteria
being used for homology and non-homology (albeit
implicitly) in a series of papers on the courtship displays of
the birds of paradise by Scholes (2008a, b).
Birds of paradise are a type of lek-breeding passerine
that are most well known for their eccentric courtship
displays and impressive plumage. The clade is also
impressive for the disparity in courtship displays across the
species within it—there are large gaps in the courtship
display phenotypes between even closely related lineages.
Scholes (2008a, b) captures this discontinuity by compar-
ing the elements and sequential ordering of elements in the
courtship displays of various birds of paradise. He uses
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both topology and positioning, as well as functional dis-
tinctiveness, to discern whether the courtship display ele-
ments are homologous or novel.
To do this, Scholes (2008a, b) breaks up the displays
into phases according to the particular function of the
element (e.g., searching for mates, sampling those present,
solicitation of individuals), and the order in which the
elements occur. Scholes identifies novel characters that
arise in the courtship displays across the clade by looking
at the sequence of elements of each display, their function,
and order. An element is a novelty if it serves a distinc-
tively new function and/or occupies a novel position in the
display sequence. For example, imagine a display sequence
of \ searching for mates [\ sampling females [
\ solicitation[ . A novel behavioral element is identifiable
by the presence of a functional element in a new position
(e.g.,\ searching for mates [\ sampling females [
\ solicitation[\ sampling females [), or a totally new
functional element (e.g.,\ searching for mates [\ sam-
pling females [\ defensive display [\ solicitation[).
This analysis picks out traits of interest to EvoDevo
biologists. Indeed, Scholes uses his analysis of novelty in
the courtship displays of the birds of paradise to argue that
the disparity and diversity of courtship displays in the clade
are not just a product of variation on existing display ele-
ments, but also the innovation of new elements. This is
exactly the type of phenomena—disparity and diversity in
the tree of life—that EvoDevo seeks to account for and the
type of explanation that it seeks to offer.
It is worth noting before I move on that although I have
focused on courtship displays here, there are a number of
similar ritualized sequences of behavior within the animal
kingdom that are likely to be similarly amenable to this
analysis. Ritualized contest behavior (such as is seen in
elks, moose, and other deer species), greeting behaviors
(such as the sexualized greetings common in primate
troops), feeding behaviors (such as the begging of baby
birds), and other systematic and invariant behaviors, such
as web building in spiders, are likely to be able to be
analyzed using Wenzel’s (1992) criteria.
Birdsongs consist of a stereotyped pattern of a number
of repeated distinct syllable types. In all species of
songbird studied, the particular songs a bird sings are
learned from other birds during a sensitive developmental
period (Slater and Lachlan 2003). Much like with
courtship displays, birdsongs can be broken up into
elements.
The largest unit of behavior is the repertoire; this refers
to all the songs of a particular bird. This can be broken into
smaller units at the level of songs—discrete segments of
the repertoire that are made up of even smaller units known
as song elements. Song elements are present in each song
in particular order.
Variation at the level of the song arises in a number of
ways, most often through the reuse of song elements from
other parts of the repertoire, although occasionally through
wholesale invention (Lachlan and Servedio 2004). The
criteria for homology can be used to discern the former
class of cases (which may be best classed as homologies)
from the latter, which are discontinuous with earlier song
elements, and thus non-homologous. In contrast to the case
of courtship displays above, topology and positioning is not
obviously useful here because of the ubiquity of reused
elements. Rather, looking for a lack of intermediaries and
lack of special qualities is more important.
Using sound analysis equipment, songs can be recorded
and compared between individuals and across species to
quantitatively assess the distinctiveness of song elements.
If a song contains no existing song elements from a rep-
ertoire or no derivatives of existing elements, then it can be
classed as a novelty.
Being able to identify novel song elements, and thus
investigate the mechanisms of song innovation, has rami-
fications for our understanding of the evolution of bird-
songs and songbirds more generally. There is evidence that
song learning reduces the time to speciation in songbirds
by increasing the rate at which new elements can propagate
through populations (Lachlan and Servedio 2004). Given
this, we might also expect song innovation to increase the
rate of speciation by offering more grist for the cultural
mill, so to speak. In other words, as with ritualized dis-
plays, we would expect lineages or clades with higher rates
of song innovation to be bushier than those that have lower
rates of song innovation. Explaining this diversity would
require reference to phenotypic novelty, and the processes
of innovation underpinning it.
Challenges to Application of the Criteria
There are three key challenges to the use of Wenzel’s
(1992) criteria in the behavioral domain. First, the use of
the criteria relies on a clear means of delineating behav-
ioral units. There is no principled means of delineating
behavioral units in the literature (Martin and Bateson 2007,
pp. 121–134). Second, the criteria—in particular the sec-
ond and third—require a means of quantifying behavioral
similarity and difference. As with the method of delineat-
ing behavioral units, measuring similarity and difference in
behavior is notoriously difficult (Martin and Bateson 2007,
pp. 121–134). Third, the criteria are difficult to apply to
plastic traits. I will consider these each in turn.
Delineating Behavior into Traits
This challenge concerns how we divide behaviors and
other related characters into elements. For example, our
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assessment of the novelty of an element of a bird courtship
display using positioning is dependent on how fine or
coarse-grained our division of the display into phases is. If
we are coarse-grained in our delineation of the display into
phases we may decide that, rather than being an entirely
new element, a novel wing flap in a bird of paradise
courtship display is best classed as variation on an existing
element (much like a new fossa on an existing bone). If, on
the other hand, we are more fine-grained in our delineation,
we may decide that the same wing flap element is a nov-
elty. Unlike in the case of a bony appendage—where we
can visually discern between novel elements and mere
flourishes by considering disconnections and articula-
tions—it is not clear how to objectively segment a court-
ship display into elements, and hence, whether the
apparently new element is an element at all.
The same problem recurs with both the special quality
and presence of intermediates criteria. If we are coarse-
grained in our delineation of behavioral characters it is very
easy to get homology; if we are fine-grained novelty
abounds.
While this challenge to the use of Wenzel’s (1992)
criteria is significant, it is a challenge faced by all studies of
behavioral evolution; the problem of the appropriate unit of
analysis for behavioral characters being a long recognized
issue in ethology (Barlow 1968; Drummond 1981). It is
tempting to respond, at least with respect to novelty, by
simply saying that it doesn’t matter whether our assess-
ments of novelty are hard and fast or not as it is merely a
guide to research, but this by itself is not a completely
adequate response. Our criteria for novelty will not be
useful in guiding research if they are so permissive as to
make every variation in behavior a novelty, or so rigid as to
make nothing novel.
Existing evidence from phylogenetics offers a potential
solution to the problem. Phylogenies will already exist for
many of the species whose behavior we wish to consider
from the EvoDevo perspective. These phylogenies—built
largely using data regarding morphological and genetic
homologies offer the means to test the accuracy of any
given delineation of behavior into elements. Such testing
would involve, first, segmenting our behavior of interest
into characters and elements using whichever candidate
schema seems most appropriate. Second, identifying
characters within a group of species as homologous or non-
homologous using Wenzel’s (1992) criteria. Third, build-
ing a phylogeny of the group using this information.
Fourth, comparing the new phylogeny we have developed
using behavioral information with existing phylogenies. If
the phylogenies match (i.e., the phylogenetic relationships
represented in each tree are similar), then we have good
reason to think that the segmentation scheme we have
adopted identified the behavioral characters and their
elements and their relationships accurately. If, however, the
trees differ significantly, we should be skeptical about the
adequacy of our segmentation technique. Phylogenetic data
may also help with a second problem for applying the
proposed criteria for non-homology.
Assessing Behavioral Distinctiveness
Both the criteria of special quality and of the presence of
intermediates require us to assess the similarity and dif-
ference between characters; in other words, their distinc-
tiveness. For behavioral traits this is challenging; first,
because of the difficulties of appropriately delineating
behavioral traits as above. Second, because it is hard to
determine what the appropriate metric for assessing
behavioral similarity should be. This problem is nicely
illustrated using birdsong. While we can use software to
analyze sound and consider its similarities and differences,
what level of difference is appropriate for novelty is
unclear. Is a slightly exaggerated trill on a song element
sufficient for that element to be a novelty, for example?
What if the trill was accompanied by an increase in pitch?
There is also good reason to think that we are not nec-
essarily looking for distinctiveness that is absolute when
looking for behavioral novelties. Many behavioral ele-
ments paradigmatically described as ‘‘innovations’’ in the
animal behavior literature involve some level of rede-
ployment. For example, the milk bottle opening by blue tits
(Parus caeruleus) is often thought to be an impressive and
interesting example of a behavior that is novel (Sherry and
Galef 1984, 1990; Lefebvre and Bouchard 2003), but its
distinctiveness is relatively low. The milk bottle opening
behavior involves the redeployment of already used motor
patterns (pecking) on a new medium (bottle caps). The
behavior is not strictly functionally distinct (although we
can make it so if we offer a very narrow account of what
the function is) as pecking open parcels of food is normal
blue tit behavior.
Once again, as with the delineation of behaviors, I
suspect that the solution to this problem is to do some
empirical work where we use multiple metrics for dis-
tinctiveness, and then assess which metrics guide us to
interesting cases in the context of innovation in EvoDevo.
We may find the methodology of using existing phyloge-
nies to test the relationships we discover via behavioral
methods discussed earlier useful here as well. Ultimately,
however, whether or not to classify the types of ‘‘innova-
tive’’ behaviors such as the blue tit bottle opening as
novelties really depends on whether the metric we use
which allows for their inclusion offers up a category of
interest to EvoDevo. We can only work this out through
empirical study.
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Identifying Novelty When There is Plasticity
The plasticity of behavioral traits can make the identification
of novelty particularly difficult. Chimpanzees (Pan troglo-
dytes) offer a good illustration of this. Chimpanzee groups
exhibit a high level of within-population behavioral vari-
ability. This variation is primarily thought to be the product
of differences in learning, innovation, and social transmis-
sion between chimpanzee groups rather than a consequence
of inherited genetic differences. In short, the variation in
behavior is a product of behavioral plasticity coupled with
cultural inheritance (Whiten et al. 1999). In the case of
chimpanzee behavior, Wenzel’s (1992) criteria offer little
assistance in the identification of novelty. First, there is often
no species-specific behavior to compare any putative nov-
elty to, which makes identifying a comparison class for
novelty difficult and potentially arbitrary. And second,
because chimpanzee behavioral traits can be transferred
between individuals via learning, they can be inherited both
vertically and horizontally, and thus, the continuity of
intermediates criterion can present us with false negatives
and positives. For example, an individual may have behav-
iors that their parents lacked but those behaviors should not
be classed as novel because they were learned from non-
relatives (i.e., already present in the population). A third
reason to be skeptical about the applicability of Wenzel’s
criteria in the chimpanzee case is that often in chimpanzee
bands we can trace conformity in behavior to common
learning rules or dispositions rather than a shared common
ancestor. For example, many individuals within a band of
chimpanzees may independently come up with the same
behavioral solution to a foraging problem as a consequence
of their use of similar learning rules. This muddies the water
with respect to what is, and is not, a homologous behavior.
These challenges to applying Wenzel’s criteria general-
ize to many more cases than just chimpanzees. According to
recent analyses of intraspecific behavioral variability
(‘‘animal personalities’’; Dall et al. 2004; Dingemanse and
Wolf 2010; Re´ale et al. 2010; Stamps and Groothuis 2010)
there are often significant variations in behavior within
animal groups. Similarly, there is evidence of learning and
the transmission of behaviors between individuals via social
learning in many species (Avital and Jablonka 2000; Laland
and Galef 2009). This may mean that the criteria for novelty
offered here are only applicable to a small domain of
behaviors rather than behavior in general. Regardless, this
issue will not be resolved without further conceptual work.
Conclusion
I began the article by outlining why EvoDevo cares about
discontinuities in the tree of life—such discontinuities are
difficult to explain without reference to development. I
then outlined criteria used in EvoDevo for identifying
morphological novelty. Building upon modifications to
these criteria for behavior by Wenzel (1992), I then offered
the means to identify behavioral novelty. This article is a
starting point for the exploration of behavioral novelty and
innovation from the EvoDevo perspective. While I have
offered a set of criteria that can be used to assess behavioral
non-homology, there remain difficulties associated with
their use. In this light, and given the role novelty plays in
EvoDevo more broadly, the criteria I offer here are best
understood as a heuristic through which we can focus our
research into behavioral novelties and the origination of
behavioral traits. In particular, the criteria allow us to
objectively identify features that are candidate novelties.
As with the turtle shell case discussed earlier, it may be that
further study of cognition and development will ultimately
offer a way to explicate these behavioral novelties within
the paradigm offered by the MS, but this is not a problem
for the criteria. Their role is to give focus for enquiry of
those concerned with the origination of behavior. The
criteria offer a place from which we can begin to under-
stand the processes of behavioral innovation.
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